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Abstract 
Online fundraising, self-image, and the long-term impact of ask 
avoidance* 
 
 
 
We provide the first field evidence pointing at the role of pure self-image, inde-
pendent of social image, in charitable giving. In an online fundraising campaign 
for a social youth project run on an opera ticket booking platform we document 
how individuals appear to engage in self-deception to preserve their self-image. 
In addition, we provide evidence on stark adverse long-run effects of the fund-
raising campaign for ticket sales. “Avoiding the ask,” opera customers who faced 
more insistent online fundraising buy fewer tickets in the following season. Our 
results suggest that fundraising management should not decide in isolation about 
their campaigns, even if very successful. Rather broader operational concerns 
have to be considered. 
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1 Introduction 
  
Over the last decade online fundraising has gained enormous popularity among fundraising 
managers. Its key advantage is, of course, that it is tremendously cheap. Transaction costs for 
internet-based fundraising, in particular those borne by the fundraisers, are easily one order of 
magnitude lower than for more traditional campaign forms. However, the reduction in costs goes 
hand in hand with an increase in social distance and, thus, reduced “social pressure,” potentially 
diminishing the return of a fundraising campaign. 
 
In this paper we study a form of online fundraising that has become popular among the 
fundraising managers of arts charities: an ask at the time of checkout when customers buy tickets 
for an event. In our case, an opera house asks for support for a social youth project introducing 
disadvantaged school children to the world of opera. We study three incarnations of that ask by 
varying the donation interface within the booking platform of the opera house. After establishing 
a baseline, we pushed up the grid of suggested donations in the expectation that it would increase 
donations. This failed miserably. We then introduced an apparently minor change in the interface, 
forcing customers who want to continue without a donation to tick one of two boxes that were 
already present before. One box says “I have donated already,” the other “No, thank you.” As we 
will document, this minor change in the choice architecture has strong positive effects on giving. 
 
There are a number of recent papers that examine the role of social pressure and social rewards 
for giving (which we briefly discuss in a literature section below). The closest relatives to our 
investigation are recent studies investigating why and how people might want to avoid being 
asked for a donation in the first place. As impressively documented by DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier (2012) and Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017) people are willing to exert costly 
effort to avoid the social pressure and emotional triggers from direct interaction with fundraisers. 
They choose “not to be at home” when a fundraiser has announced his arrival at their doorstep or 
choose different entrances in supermarkets to avoid the ask. In our setting, this type of social 
interaction was absent. People interacted with the ticketing website without being talked to or 
being directly observed. Rather, they could choose not to give by clicking on a button to 
“proceed” without further ado. In all our settings, the interface contained two check boxes (“I 
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have donated already” and “No, thank you”). Customers could always “explain” their decision 
not to give by saying that they had given before or adding the courteous “No, thank you.” But in 
the first two settings they were not forced to. That is, they could click on the “proceed” button 
ignoring – vis-à-vis themselves – their (implicit) decision not to give. This is what we changed in 
our third treatment which forced customers to check one of the two boxes if they wanted to 
proceed without a donation. Notice that this changes nothing in the relationship between the 
customer and the opera house. The opera house observes the customer’s decision in all settings. 
The boxes do not contain any extra information. Regardless of whether a customer donates or 
not, it will be known by the opera house in all conditions. There is no change in (actually exerted) 
social pressure,1 that is, no change in the substance of the interaction between potential donor and 
fundraiser. The only thing that does change is that the non-donor is forced to make a choice 
between two boxes. As this choice has neither social nor material consequences, it can affect 
behavior only through its impact on self-image. Clicking on “proceed” without ticking one of the 
two boxes allows, after all, for some potentially attractive self-deception. The “proceed” button 
might be perceived as an invitation simply to proceed with the purchase and the fact that the 
decision to proceed implies the decision not to donate can potentially be conveniently 
overlooked. Non-donors are not forced to admit to themselves that they are non-donors. Forcing 
customers to tick one of the two boxes (the first of which equates to an outright lie for the vast 
majority of customers) shuts down this option of self-deception. Now, non-donors have no other 
option but to admit to themselves that they are non-donors. As it turns out, there is a substantial 
share of customers for whom this admission is sufficiently costly, such that they choose to donate 
when otherwise they would not have. On average, they also donate higher amounts. We provide a 
model sketch for such behavior in the spirit of Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole 
(2006) where customers can protect their “diagnostic” or “ego utility” through self-deception. 
 
Finally, we observe that customers “learn to avoid the ask” in the long run.  One year later, 
customers who were forced to admit that they were non-donors buy fewer tickets through the 
                                                          
1 Of course, we do not know what individuals actually think. As one referee pointed out there is some room for a 
change in perceived social pressure or that, alternatively, limited attention may play a role. Individuals may overlook 
the donation choice and the intervention forced them to process the decision to give. Our data would not allow us to 
identify such a channel separately. From that perspective, our explanation is very much tied to the (parsimonious) 
model that we sketch in Section 3, that is, although we do not engage in a fully structural approach, we look at the 
data with a simple structure in mind. 
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online platform than those who were not forced to do so. Luckily, however, the total effect on 
tickets purchased through all the possible means (including box office, mail and phone) is smaller 
and not significant suggesting that customers simply changed the channel through which they 
acquired tickets. In other contexts where such substitution is more difficult more severe 
consequences could have materialized. This suggests that fundraising management has to be 
holistically integrated into larger operational concerns and with success measures that transcend 
beyond the narrow realm of net proceeds from fundraising as such.  
 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of 
related literature, focusing on our four main themes: online fundraising; the role of defaults and 
donation grids; the role of image for prosocial behavior; and ask avoidance. In Section 3 we 
present a simple model with ego utility that can explain self-deception by an egoistic type. 
Section 4 describes the design of our study and the data. Section 5 and 6 provide the main results 
and Section 7 adds a discussion. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2 Related literature  
 
Online fundraising. With the rise of the internet, online fundraising has become ever more 
popular and economically important. Smith, Windmeijer, and Wright (2015) document how 
online fundraising has become a major source of income for many UK charities. The total 
revenue of the biggest individual online fundraising website recently crossed the £1 billion mark. 
According to Meer (2014), Kickstarter.com, a leading US crowd funding website, crossed the $1 
billion threshold in March 2014. Germany’s biggest platform, Betterplace.org, collected a total of 
€1.17 million in revenues for charitable organizations over an eleven month period in 2012/13 
(Altmann et al. 2014).  
 
There is a growing number of online experiments and field studies that (i) either consider 
donation platforms (Altmann et al. 2014; Meer 2014), (ii) environments in which the fundraiser 
actively asks for donations (Chen, Li, and MacKie-Mason 2006; Exley and Petrie 2016) or (iii) 
other forms including peer-to-peer solicitations (Bøg et al. 2012; Castillo, Petrie, and Wardell 
2015; Elfenbein, Fisman, and McManus 2012). Our study is closest to the second type – it is a 
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situation in which individuals come to the website to buy opera tickets and are not expecting to 
be asked for donations, since the opera house has never used online fundraising before. This type 
of add-on fundraising has not been yet studied extensively, although it may have important 
implications for the main business. 
 
Image motives in charitable giving. Ariely et al. (2009) distinguish between three broad 
categories of motives for charitable giving: intrinsic, extrinsic and image motivation. The third of 
these includes “the desire to be liked and respected by others and by one-self.” The authors show 
that individuals donate more when they can publicly signal their pro-sociality. Allowing for 
public signals of pro-sociality has also been confirmed by other authors to be effective in 
increasing charitable giving (see the literature cited in Glazer and Konrad (1996) who offer a 
theoretical model of signaling as an explanation for giving).  
 
The psychology literature has recognized self-signaling as an important behavioral force, see e.g. 
Bodner and Prelec (2003) and a number of laboratory experiments have sought to understand its 
relevance. In Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) individuals behave less pro-socially in the 
laboratory if they can make their actions less transparent to both others and themselves. In a lab 
experiment by Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2013) individuals choose their donation and their choice 
is implemented with some probability. At the final stage they can withdraw their donation choice. 
The authors explain numerous observed revisions through satiation in self-signaling at the earlier 
stage and higher monetary cost at the end. By varying the probability of the implementation and 
the observability of a chosen allocation, Grossman (2015) aims at disentangling self- and social 
signaling. He finds little evidence for self-signaling and stronger evidence for social signaling. In 
contrast, Grossman and van der Weele (2017) are able to identify the role of self-signaling in a 
laboratory study. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) suggest that individuals behave dishonestly 
when it pays but are willing to incur significant costs to maintain their self-image. Bénabou and 
Tirole (2006) propose a model which combines the different motives in prosocial behavior 
including self and social signaling and point out the complex interplay of both. In our context, 
individuals appear to deceive themselves by overlooking the donation request when possible but 
donate non-negligible amounts if as non-donors they are forced to admit to themselves that they 
are indeed non-donors. 
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Social pressure, ask avoidance, and unintended consequences of fundraising. While allowing for 
signaling of one’s pro-sociality, a public ask creates social pressure when individuals do not want 
to appear greedy or have difficulties in turning down the fundraiser. This creates costs for the 
individuals who may, in response, take measures to avoid the ask. This has been documented in 
DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) and Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017). These 
studies have in common that there is some direct social interaction between fundraiser and donor 
or between different donors – rendering social signaling and social pressure possible. In an online 
fundraising campaign (without direct social interaction), Exley and Petrie (2016) vary whether an 
upcoming ask is expected or not. The additional time to deliberate leads to a 22% lower rate at 
which the individuals agree to be forwarded to the donation pages. This difference is strongly 
reduced if subjects receive additional information about projects which they cannot avoid. Exley 
and Petrie conclude that individuals are searching for excuses not to donate if given the 
opportunity to do so. Damgaard and Gravert (2016) document that reminders in fundraising – 
while increasing donations in the short term – also substantially increase unsubscriptions from the 
mailing list. The authors show the hidden costs of reminders: annoyance costs for the solicited 
and long-term effects on donations for the charity. Knutsson, Martinsson, and Wollbrant (2013) 
find that the introduction of a donation button at recycling machines in a chain store in Sweden 
led to a reduction in the recycling amount at those machines. The authors conjecture that 
customers shifted locations for their recycling since the overall material recovered had not 
decreased over the analyzed period.  
 
Defaults and donation grids. It is popular in fundraising to suggest amounts that can be donated. 
Suggestions offer guidance in choosing contributions and transmit information about how much 
is needed. In practice, suggestions can be implemented in different ways – they can be more or 
less binding and there is either one suggestion (usually a default which may be changed) or a 
menu to choose from (donation grids). There are a number of studies concerned with donation 
grids or defaults and the conclusions are mixed. For an extensive literature review and a 
discussion, see Adena, Huck, and Rasul (2014) who study the effect of nonbinding suggestions in 
a field experiment. They find that suggestions of €100 and €200 increase the average positive 
donation significantly as compared to a treatment without suggestions. The overall revenue effect 
is, however, non-significant due to reductions in the response rates. Altmann et al. (2014) study 
defaults and conclude that although they do change the distribution of donations, they do not 
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have an effect on aggregate donations. This is because the defaults exert pulling effects, both 
increasing and decreasing donations. However, in a secondary choice dimension, a contribution 
to support the running costs of the online platform, donations do increase with defaults. Finally, 
Reiley and Samek (2015) find that increasing donation grids by 20% leads to a decrease in 
response rate by 15–16% and a similar average positive donation. Approximately doubling the 
donation grids leads to a drop in response rate by 16% and 11% lower average donation, yielding 
an overall decrease in return of 24%. 
 
3 A model sketch  
 
We can capture the role of self-deception in our online environment with a model in the spirit of 
Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) where decision making has two 
elements: a choice component based on true consumption preferences and a judgement module 
that also cares for diagnostic or ego utility. See also Dubé, Luo, and Fang (2016) for a similar 
approach in a similar context – cause marketing where the sale of an object is bundled with a 
charitable donation. Specifically, we consider the case where decision makers have some 
uncertainty about their own type, here their prosocial attitude, and derive ego utility that is 
increasing in their belief that they are a “good” type, that is, a type who cares about others. 
 
Let us sketch the simplest version of such a model. We assume that there are just two types, an 
egoist and an (imperfect) altruist. The decision maker’s consumption utility is 𝑢(𝑥)  +  𝑣(𝑐)  
where 𝑥 denotes private consumption and c the donation to a charitable good, with 𝑢’ > 0, 
𝑢’’ < 0 for both types, 𝑣’ > 0, 𝑣’’ < 0 for the altruistic type and 𝑣’ = 0 for the egoistic type.  
 
Consumption utility is driving choices. Total utility is modelled as:  
 
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑐,𝛽)  =  𝑢(𝑥)  +  𝑣(𝑐)  +  𝐸(𝛽)   
 
where 𝐸(𝛽)  is the ego utility derived from attaching a probability of 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] to being the 
altruistic type. In such a setup the decision maker can strategically manipulate his decision in 
order to protect his ego utility.   
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Let I denote the decision maker’s disposable income. Then in the absence of ego utility or, to be 
more precise, for constant ego utility (that is, for 𝐸’ = 0) the decision maker will make a donation 
if and only if 𝑢’(𝐼)  <  𝑣’(0). For the egoistic type this is, of course, never the case but let us 
suppose that at income level 𝐼, the condition holds for the altruist such that he would make a 
donation of 𝑐∗ in the absence of ego utility.  
 
Once 𝐸’ > 0, things become more interesting as the decision maker is now engaged in a self-
signaling game. Let the decision maker’s prior in this game be denoted by ?̂? and let us assume 
that the decision maker, once he expresses his decision not to donate cannot fool himself into 
believing that he did. For off-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy the intuitive criterion there are two 
equilibrium candidates for this game: (A) a pooling equilibrium where both types donate 𝑐∗ and 
(B) a separating equilibrium where the altruist donates and the egoist does not. Pooling with both 
types not donating would not satisfy the intuitive criterion as the altruist could deviate to making 
a donation, increasing both, his consumption and ego utility. For our purposes the interesting 
equilibrium candidate is (A) where both types donate. This equilibrium exists if 𝑢(𝐼 − 𝑐∗)  +
 𝐸(?̂?)  >  𝑢(𝐼)  +  𝐸(0), that is, if the egoist’s self-revelation to be the egoist weighs heavily 
enough on him to make a strategic donation. The same condition rules out equilibrium type (B). 
 
Things change once we introduce the option for decision makers to forget a past choice or trick 
themselves into believing there was no choice to be made. This is exactly what a direct click on 
the “proceed” button – without ticking one of the two boxes explaining the choice – may achieve. 
In this case the egoist has the possibility to preserve his prior by clicking on the “proceed” button 
conveniently “overlooking” the fundraising call. In this case, the two types will separate but 
learning will be incomplete: while the altruist learns his type by making donation 𝑐∗ and 
achieving total utility 𝑢(𝐼 − 𝑐∗)  +  𝑣(𝑐∗)  +  𝐸(1), the egoist successfully fools himself thinking 
that he did not make a decision achieving total utility of  𝑢(𝐼)  +  𝐸(?̂?). In other words, the egoist 
preserves his self-image by engaging in self-deception.  
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4 Description of the quasi-experiment 
 
An opera house in Germany introduced an online fundraising tool for a period of approximately 
three months. When individuals sought to buy tickets, they first logged in/registered, selected 
tickets, and then decided to proceed with the payment. At this point they were asked to support a 
charitable project aimed to introduce school children from socially disadvantaged areas to 
classical music and opera. Customers could contribute to a fund that pays for children who would 
otherwise have no access to opera. When deciding on the amount they wanted to donate they 
could choose a number of “tickets” in different price categories. This had mainly technical 
reasons as the ticketing tool employed by the opera house can only accept payments for tickets. 
Hence, the charitable project had to feature as a “performance” in the ticketing system for which 
donors could buy arbitrarily many tickets in different “price categories,” the sum of which 
generated their total donation. This is similar to introducing a number of possible defaults 
through a donation grid (see, for example, Reiley and Samek 2015) with the small difference that 
our donors could choose “multiple tickets” in one or multiple price categories at the same time.  
 
There were two subsequent changes in the design of the online fundraising tool. The first change 
occurred after 28 days and involved roughly a doubling of the donation categories from €10, €20, 
€50, and €100 to €20, €50, €100, and €200 Euros respectively. The second change occurred after 
a further 33 days of operation and an additional 11 days of suspension.2 The higher grid remained 
in place but now the buyers were forced to tick either the “I have donated already” or the “No, 
thank you” box if they decided to proceed to the payment stage without making a donation. These 
two checking boxes had also been available in the previous treatments, but one could click the 
button “proceed” without checking them. Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix A show the exact 
implementation. The last period continued for 20 days and the online fundraising campaign was 
completely suspended afterwards. 
 
We do not expect giving behavior to be affected by any major holiday. Indeed, the Easter holiday 
fell into the suspension period between treatment 2 and treatment 3, and if at all, we would have 
expected it to affect the donations at the end of treatment 2 positively, which was not the case. 
                                                          
2 The suspension occurred during Easter holidays. 
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Also, the online fundraising campaign did not coincide with the end of the fiscal year.3  In what 
follows we shall refer to the three treatments as T1, T2, and T3. The choice of the grids for the 
current study was based on evidence from a fundraising campaign with a similar sample of opera-
goers – a field experiment documented in Adena, Huck, and Rasul (2014) which studied the 
effect of nonbinding suggestions.4  
 
4.1 Sample and empirical strategy 
 
The final sample consists of 8,442 customers that arrived at the platform in the period under 
study. We excluded frequent buyers (1,136) who arrived in at least two different treatments in 
order to avoid spillover effects (Appendix A4 offers some additional analysis including frequent 
buyers). Although there was no random assignment into treatments, the decision when to buy 
tickets does not depend on treatments directly. However, different compositions of customers and 
pools of tickets over time potentially pose a challenge for the identification of the effects of 
interest. Appendix A2 offers some descriptive statistic at the level of treatments and day by day. 
It also describes the composition of the available tickets and buyers at the platform, the numbers 
and the types of tickets bought and the prices in detail. Importantly, given a day by day release of 
new tickets, the available ticket pool remains approximately constant over time.5 There are some 
differences between treatments in terms of total spent on tickets and the number of tickets 
bought, however, they do not seem to favor one treatment over another (see Table A1). In our 
empirical strategy, we make sure that any potential differences between treatments other than our 
experimental variation do not affect our results. First, we control for an extensive set of 
observables including the following variable categories: flexible ticket controls at time of 
purchase, past season controls, performance controls, time controls, and demographics. Second, 
when adding the above variable categories separately, the magnitude of coefficients of interest 
remains stable, which suggests that, under any correlation between observables and 
unobservables, unobservables are not driving our results. Third, we show that the magnitude of 
                                                          
3 The fiscal year in Germany ends in December, almost a month before the online campaign started. 
4 In that study, one treatment involved a €100 suggestion and another €200 suggestion. The first suggestion was 
followed by over 50% of donors, and the second by over 20%. The median donations were €100 in both treatments. 
In view of that, and given the average spending on opera tickets at each visit in similar range, the suggested grids are 
not particularly high. 
5 The exceptions are festival tickets for which we control in the main analysis. 
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the coefficients of interest does not depend on the specific timing. We present results using much 
shorter periods around the change in treatment. Since the timing of the change in treatments was 
unknown to customers, those who arrived shortly before or shortly after the change landed in a 
particular treatment quasi randomly. Finally, we show that specific types of customers are not 
driving our results. 
 
5 Individual-level results 
 
In Tables 1 and 2 we regress giving behavior on our treatments at the individual level. In Table 1 
the results are presented in terms of the response rates (logit specification with a donation dummy 
as a dependent variable) and in Table 2 in terms of the return to fundraising (OLS regression with 
donation value including zeros as a dependent variable).6 The base treatment is T2, since we are 
primarily interested in comparisons between T1–T2 and T2–T3. Different columns present 
results after inclusion of different sets of controls, and Column V shows the results after the 
inclusion of all controls. Gender dummies for female and other (for couples and other) are 
included in all specifications. The OLS specification also includes corporate dummy.7 Ticket 
controls at t reflect current prices and individual demand. They include: individual average value 
of tickets, individual average value of tickets squared, individual average value of tickets cubed, 
individual number of tickets, daily average value of tickets. Past season controls that we found to 
be relevant for the time of arrival at the platform include:  dummy customer in previous season, 
number of tickets in previous season, individual average value of tickets in previous season, and 
dummies for means through which tickets had been ordered in previous season dummy (box 
office, mail, phone). Performance controls reflect individual tastes and include: separate 
performance dummies for five performances with the largest number of tickets in the sample (A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, Rigoletto, The Yellow Sound, Salome, Boris Godunow), 
performance type dummies (opera north,8 other opera, ballet, other, the excluded category is 
concert), and a festival ticket dummy. Note that a number of the performances (including those 
                                                          
6 Last column in Table 4 additionally presents results from a Tobit regression, and Table A3 in the Appendix shows 
results from rare events logit. 
7 In logit specification the corporate dummy is dropped because of collinearity (no corporate is a donor in our 
sample). 
8 The category opera north includes mostly German language operas by Richard Strauss, Richard Wagner, and 
others. The category other opera includes mostly Italian language operas. 
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listed above) were played repeatedly, and the period in which the tickets were sold spanned 
different treatments. By including performance dummies, we can compare the reactions to 
different treatments by people who decided to attend the same performance.9 Finally, time 
controls relate to the timing of arrival at the platform and include: time to performance, time to 
performance x festival ticket dummy, day of week dummies. The coefficients on T1 and T3 
remain relatively stable independent of the set of controls included and strongly suggest that the 
effects found can indeed be attributed to the treatment variations.  
 
Compared to T2, the response rate is significantly higher in T1 with an additional 0.7 percentage 
point and it is significantly higher in T3 by 1 percentage point.10 The same holds for the return 
per buyer, which is significantly higher in T1 by around 11 cents and in T3 by around 46 cents.  
 
Table 1: Response to fundraising 
Dependent variable: donation dummy 
Specification Logit m.e. 
 I II III IV V 
T1:lower grids 0.007*** 
(2.81) 
0.007*** 
(2.78) 
0.007*** 
(2.60) 
0.007*** 
(2.99) 
0.007*** 
(2.68) 
T3: statement required 0.010*** 
(3.24) 
0.010*** 
(3.64) 
0.011*** 
(3.48) 
0.009*** 
(3.65) 
0.010*** 
(2.86) 
Ticket controls at t yes  
 
 
 
 
 
yes 
Past season controls  
 
yes  
 
 
 
yes 
Performance controls  
 
 
 
yes  
 
yes 
Time controls    yes yes 
Demographics  yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9028 9028 9028 9028 9028 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.072 
Wald Test T1≥T3, p-value 0.094 0.065 0.035 0.110 0.119 
Notes: non-frequent buyers; unit of observation: buyer per day; errors clustered at the day level; z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; m.e.: marginal effects; Ticket controls at t include: individual average value of tickets, individual 
average value of tickets squared, individual  average value of tickets cubed, individual number of tickets, daily average value of 
tickets; Past season controls include: dummy customer in previous season, number of tickets in previous season, individual 
average value of tickets in previous season, box office in previous season dummy, letter in previous season dummy, phone in 
previous season dummy; Performance controls include: separate performance dummies for five performances with the largest 
number of tickets in the sample (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Rigoletto, The Yellow Sound, Salome, Boris Godunow), 
performance type dummies (opera nord, other opera, ballet, other, excluded category is concert), festival ticket dummy; Time 
controls include: time to performance, time to performance x festival ticket dummy, day of week dummies; Demographics include 
female and other dummy. 
                                                          
9 A complete fixed effects approach with all performance dummies included is not feasible for collinearity reasons 
and undesirable because of a large number of nuisance parameters to be estimated. 
10 Table A3 in the Appendix A presents the results of rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001). Those results suggest 
an increase in T1 relative to T2 by 0.5 percentage point. The increase in T3 relative to T2 is estimated to 0.9–1.1 
percentage points. 
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The experiment is not designed to directly compare T1 with T3 since it includes a twofold 
change. Still, it is interesting to see whether the loss from the higher grid was reversed by the 
change in the navigation.  A Wald test rejects the null T1≥T3 at p<0.10 in all response 
specifications and at p<0.05 in all return specifications (except Tobit, see bottom of Table 1 and 
Table 2). This suggests that the loss from the introduction of higher grids was more than 
compensated by the change in website navigation. 
 
 
Table 2: Return from fundraising 
Dependent variable: donation value including zeros 
Specification: OLS Tobit m.e. y* 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1:lower grids 0.121** 
(2.24) 
0.125** 
(2.32) 
0.091 
(1.47) 
0.136*** 
(2.74) 
0.110** 
(2.04) 
0.249*** 
(2.92) 
T3: statement 
required 
0.489*** 
(2.87) 
0.489*** 
(3.18) 
0.481*** 
(2.87) 
0.453*** 
(3.10) 
0.457** 
(2.44) 
0.373*** 
(3.16) 
Ticket controls at t yes  
 
 
 
 
 
yes yes 
Past season 
controls 
 
 
yes  
 
 
 
yes yes 
Performance type 
controls 
 
 
 
 
yes  
 
yes yes 
Time controls    yes yes yes 
Demographics  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9028 9028 9028 9028 9028 9028 
R2 /Pseudo R2 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.042 
Wald Test T1≥T3, 
p-value 0.0204 0.0129 0.0226 0.0174 0.0417 0.2024 
Notes: see notes to Table 1; t- and z-statistics in parentheses, Marginal effects after Tobit with lower limit set to zero in Column 
VI; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy in OLS specifications. 
 
We also show that the results do not depend on the specific timing. In order to address the 
additional worry about potential time trends influencing our results, we present results using 
much shorter periods around the change in treatment. Since the timing of the change in 
treatments was unknown to customers, those who arrived shortly before or shortly after the 
change landed in a particular treatment quasi randomly. Therefore, we repeat our analysis by 
looking only at individuals who arrived shortly before or after the change. Starting with 4 days 
before and after, we extend the sample day by day and present the coefficients on treatment 
dummies with confidence intervals for the donation probability and average return in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Regression coefficients from a series of regressions spanning an increasing number of 
days around the change in treatments 
 
 Response to fundraising Return 
Dependent 
variable: 
donation dummy donation value including zeros 
Specificatio
n: 
Logit m.e.  OLS  
T1: lower 
grids 
 
  
T3: forced 
statement 
  
Notes: all regressions are at the individual level and include the full set of controls (exceptions: festival tickets and 
their interaction with time is dropped in both upper graphs since festival tickets started to be available only at the end 
of T2, some other are dropped in small samples), see notes to Table 1 and Table 2. Right y axis shows the number of 
observations used in the estimation. Days (+/-) is the number of days around the change from T1 to T2 in the upper 
graphs and from T2 to T3 in the lower graphs. The upper left graph starts at +/- 6 days since the smaller sample does 
not converge. 
 
We see that both coefficients (for T1 and T3) are (almost) independent of the time span analyzed. 
Similar magnitudes to those obtained for the full sample are already estimated with a very small 
sample and time span. We also offer a placebo exercise showing that there is no similar effect of 
a fictitious treatment dummy (Figure A5 in the Appendix A). Specifically, we take the respective 
T1, T2, and T3 periods separately and create a set of fictitious treatment dummies for the first 3, 
4, 5, up to (n-3) days. Figure A5 in the Appendix shows the regression results analogue to the 
above. We see that almost all estimated coefficients (126 out of 128) are not statistically 
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significant, and most are very close to zero. Only the coefficients for the return at the end of the 
T2 period and during the T3 period are somewhat larger and closer to being significant. This, 
however, points toward an opposite time trend (if any), that should have made finding the real T3 
effect rather more difficult. Overall, we conclude that the effects that we find cannot be 
accounted for by any time specific trends other than implied by our treatments. 
 
Table 3: Heterogeneity and exclusion of festival ticket buyers 
 Probit m.e.: donation dummy OLS: return (donation value including 
zeros) 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1:lower grids 0.007* 
(1.84) 
0.008*** 
(2.88) 
0.008*** 
(2.92) 
0.024 
(0.41) 
0.134** 
(2.49) 
0.144*** 
(2.68) 
T3: statement required 0.011** 
(2.41) 
0.013*** 
(3.32) 
0.013*** 
(3.32) 
0.478* 
(1.88) 
0.574*** 
(2.82) 
0.592*** 
(2.85) 
T1 x past customer -0.005 
(-0.69) 
 
 
 0.121 
(0.55) 
 
 
 
T3 x past customer -0.005 
(-0.74) 
 
 
 -0.095 
(-0.21) 
 
 
 
T1 x average ticket 
value in past season 
above median  
0.009* 
(1.78) 
 
 
 0.311 
(0.92) 
 
 
 
T3 x average ticket 
value in past season 
above median 
0.005 
(0.86) 
 
 
 0.021 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
T3 x festival ticket 
dummy 
 
 
-0.024** 
(-2.50) 
  
 
-1.098*** 
(-4.08) 
 
Ticket controls at t yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Past season controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Performance type 
controls 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9028 9028 8317 9028 9028 8317 
Pseudo R2 /R2 0.076 0.078 0.083 0.007 0.007 0.008 
See notes to Table 1 and Table 2. In addition to respective columns V in Table 1 and 2, column I and IV of this table adds 
interaction terms between T1(T3) and past customer dummy. Column II and V adds an interaction terms between T3 and festival 
ticket dummy (at least one festival ticket). Columns III and VI exclude customers who bought at least one festival ticket. 
 
Given differences in the timing of arrival (more specifically, days between the booking and 
performance) of past versus new customers presented in Appendix A2.3 and the specific timing 
for summer festival ticket buyers, we now analyze whether those groups are potentially driving 
our results. In Table 3, we add interaction terms between treatment dummies and the past 
customer dummy as well as between treatment dummies and the individual average ticket price 
in the previous season to our main specification (Column II and V). We find no interaction 
effects. Importantly, the coefficients on T3 for the probability of giving and the return, and the 
coefficient on T1 for the probability of giving remain almost unchanged from their previous 
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values (only the T1 coefficient for the return declines and loses significance). This leads us to the 
conclusion that the treatments work in a similar way for both past customers and new customers, 
and independently of the amount spent on tickets in the last year.  Beyond that, we also test 
whether there are any interaction effects of festival ticket buyers with the T3 dummy (no festival 
tickets were sold in T1, therefore no interaction with T1, see Columns I and IV). We find that 
festival ticket buyers respond less to T3. However, the main coefficient on T3 remains significant 
and even increases in magnitude.  
Finally, in order to make sure that our analysis is not biased by customers who arrive to buy 
festival tickets towards the end of the online campaign, in Columns III and VI of Table 3, we 
repeat our main analysis on a sample that excludes customers buying festival tickets. We 
replicate the main results from Table 1 and 2, with slightly larger coefficients. 
 
 
6 Long-term impact of fundraising on ticket-related behavior 
 
 
We now analyze long-term effects of online fundraising by looking at ticket-related behavior in 
the following opera season that started 4 months and ended 15 months after the campaign. We 
use the same sample of non-frequent customers (8442 individuals) that was used in the previous 
analysis. The base treatment is, again, T2. Specifically, we are interested in the effect of T3 
relative to T2, that is, the effect of exerting more pressure on customers on ask avoidance. This is 
similar to the endeavours in Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017) and DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier (2012). However, in contrast to the immediate effects measured in these studies, we 
are interested in long-term persistence of ask avoidance.  
 
We run a set of regressions analogous to the previous section but now with next-season 
outcomes, specifically, the number of tickets purchased online (Table 4), online ticket revenue 
(Table 5), the total number of tickets purchased (also through the box office, mail, telephone, 
Table 6), and the total revenue (Table 7). The specifications include exactly the same set of 
controls as previously, and errors are, equally, clustered on day level.11  
 
                                                          
11 Refers to the purchase at t, for customers with multiple purchases, we take the very first day. 
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The results suggest that the more intensive fundraising in treatment T3 relative to the base 
treatment T2 has adverse long-term effects on online tickets and online revenue (Tables 4 and 5). 
Customers who were forced to admit being a non-donor during an online fundraising buy 
significantly fewer tickets online in the next season. The online return from those customers is 
lower as well.12 However, when accounting for all means through which tickets can be purchased 
the results turn non-significant in specifications with the full set of controls (Tables 6 and 7, 
Columns VI). This suggests substitution between different means to buy tickets. Customers avoid 
the online ask by purchasing tickets on the phone or at the box office.  
 
Our results are similar to “avoiding the ask” in DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) and 
Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017). However, the novelty of our findings is, that the ask 
avoidance at the ticketing platform persists over the long-term. This should have important 
consequences for firms and organizations for which fundraising is not the primary task like the 
opera house. Such firms and organizations need to understand how fundraising activities interact 
with other operational aspects and how they affect other sources of revenue. Of course, adverse 
short- and long-term effects of ask avoidance might be reduced through potential long-term 
positive effects stemming from those individuals who do choose to donate. It appears 
psychologically plausible that those who decided to make a donation and who, as a self-
justification of their donation, may increase their valuation of a (lavish) night at the opera. We 
cannot asses this directly since we do not know the identity of the would-be-donors who have just 
not been asked. However, the coefficients on donor dummies included in Tables 4–7, Columns 
II-VI suggest that donors (relative to treated non-donors and non-treated) are more loyal 
customers, buy more tickets, and spend more money in the next season. 
Additionally, established and new customers might react to more invasive changes to the 
interface differently as pointed out by one of the referees. Indeed, we find that the negative 
effects are mostly driven by customers that purchased tickets in the previous season already 
(results not presented). 
Finally, the substitution between the tickets bought online and through other channels relates to 
Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2012). They observed that blood donors in the US left neighboring 
                                                          
12 In Tables A4-A7 in the Appendix we present analogous results from Tobit regressions. The regressions with the 
number of tickets as a dependent variable lead to equal conclusions. The regressions with total return as dependent 
variable show less significance of the coefficients that the OLS regressions. 
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drives without incentives to attend blood drives with incentives. Our results suggest that, when 
studying fundraising and other interventions, we need to take a broad perspective. Partial 
equilibrium and short-term results might be misleading. Our evidence is the first to point to long-
term effects of fundraising campaigns.  
 
Table 4: Long-term effects on tickets online 
Dependent variable: number of tickets online in the next season (including zeros) 
Specification:  OLS 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -0.305 
(-1.11) 
-0.288 
(-1.40) 
-0.229 
(-1.39) 
-0.093 
(-0.48) 
-0.358 
(-1.51) 
-0.222 
(-1.49) 
T3: statement required -0.622** 
(-2.19) 
-1.095*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.369* 
(-1.93) 
-0.733*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.646** 
(-2.56) 
-0.430** 
(-2.22) 
Donor dummy  1.392 
(1.58) 
0.940 
(1.49) 
1.402 
(1.62) 
1.496* 
(1.70) 
1.029* 
(1.71) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
R2 0.003 0.063 0.275 0.043 0.047 0.309 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; t-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Long-term effects on revenue online 
Dependent variable: online ticket revenue in the next season (ticket value including zeros) 
Specification:  OLS 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -26.173* 
(-1.68) 
-24.538** 
(-2.24) 
-19.837** 
(-2.07) 
-15.609 
(-1.62) 
-23.148** 
(-2.41) 
-19.911*** 
(-2.72) 
T3: statement required -22.972 
(-1.43) 
-52.594*** 
(-2.94) 
-16.782 
(-1.54) 
-34.960*** 
(-2.66) 
-28.290** 
(-2.40) 
-16.861* 
(-1.73) 
Donor dummy  63.555* 
(1.96) 
43.125 
(1.60) 
63.179* 
(1.97) 
66.347** 
(2.04) 
46.780* 
(1.80) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type controls    yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
R2 0.002 0.049 0.196 0.034 0.032 0.219 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; t-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy. 
 
 
19 
 
Table 6: Long-term effects on all tickets 
Dependent variable: number of tickets (all means including online, box office, mail, and phone) in the next season (ticket value 
including zeros) 
Specification:  OLS 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -0.432 
(-0.90) 
-0.406 
(-1.13) 
-0.230 
(-1.14) 
-0.083 
(-0.26) 
-0.518 
(-1.37) 
-0.183 
(-1.07) 
T3: statement required -0.834* 
(-1.75) 
-1.673*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.217 
(-0.91) 
-1.061*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.899** 
(-2.16) 
-0.267 
(-1.13) 
Donor dummy  1.584 
(1.48) 
0.721 
(1.57) 
1.619 
(1.56) 
1.746* 
(1.67) 
0.832* 
(1.86) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
R2 0.002 0.048 0.556 0.034 0.043 0.567 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; t-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Long-term effects on whole ticket revenue 
Dependent variable: ticket revenue (all means including online, box office, mail, and phone) in the next season (ticket value 
including zeros) 
Specification:  OLS 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -28.609 
(-1.07) 
-26.563 
(-1.38) 
-13.721 
(-1.09) 
-11.832 
(-0.72) 
-24.369 
(-1.48) 
-12.439 
(-1.28) 
T3: statement required -24.915 
(-0.94) 
-76.145** 
(-2.54) 
-5.199 
(-0.36) 
-46.769** 
(-2.10) 
-39.003* 
(-1.91) 
-1.796 
(-0.13) 
Donor dummy  76.033* 
(1.88) 
26.173 
(0.70) 
74.624* 
(1.83) 
77.902* 
(1.90) 
29.492 
(0.79) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
R2 0.001 0.054 0.400 0.042 0.041 0.410 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; t-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy. 
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7 Discussion 
 
Self-image. Why do we observe more giving in T3? Individuals are more likely to donate and 
they donate higher amounts when they have to check a “No, thank you” box. This suggests that 
customers were successfully deceiving themselves in T2, behaving just as if the donation request 
had not been there, and thereby protecting their prior belief about their own type. When the act of 
declining becomes more salient, they are less likely to avoid it, and some egoistic types may now 
decide to give. This is related to the “avoiding the ask” phenomenon studied by DellaVigna, List, 
and Malmendier (2012) and Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017). In DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier (2012), individuals were less likely to be at home when they knew that a solicitor 
was coming. In Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017) some individuals chose other exit doors 
from a supermarket to avoid being asked. However, these papers’ primary concern is with social 
pressure to give and social interaction, although both, social and self-image may play a role in 
their environments. It is difficult to tell where self-image ends and social-image begins. Even if it 
appears that social image requires an audience, it is unclear what is in people’s minds when they 
are asked for donations online. They might still feel observed by the opera house, a partner or 
spouse, or might like to talk about their choices to other opera goers. In our case, however, there 
were no changes in social interaction between treatments, rendering the social-image concern 
unlikely to be relevant for treatment differences. Consequently, the check-box effect that we 
observe should stem from the self-image motive. For some individuals declining donations seems 
difficult to reconcile with their self-image, and saying “No, thank you” makes the decline 
apparent to themselves. In our context, the magnitude of the self-image motive in charitable 
giving is economically meaningful – increasing the return from fundraising six- to sevenfold or 
by 49 cents per person (after controlling for confounders).  
 
Costs of “avoiding the ask.” In contrast to the literature concerned with immediate ask 
avoidance, we are able to measure long-term effects. The short-term cost-benefit analysis in 
Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2017)  and DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) leads to a 
conclusion that, overall, the fundraising campaigns analyzed were welfare enhancing. Beyond the 
short-term effect of ask avoidance documented in these studies our results indicate a long-term 
effect, here on the number of tickets and ticket revenue for opera performances purchased online. 
This effect is negative for non-donors who faced the online fundraising campaign and positive for 
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actual donors. In order to evaluate the overall success of fundraising activities such long-term 
costs (that potentially arise in other operational arm of an organization) should be considered. 
 
Donation grids. Grids seem to exert multiple effects. On the one hand, grids serve as a reference 
point and convey information about the range of donations expected. Thus, grids that are set too 
high will deter small donors; grids set too low will lower the perceived expectation and induce 
lower donations. But the question about what is too high or too low might be an individual one, 
and for prospective donors it might be only resolved by means of trial and error. On the other 
hand, the number, the spread and the skewness of the grids chosen affects prospective donors and 
these effects are even less well understood. As discussed above, the literature on donation grids is 
not conclusive. While Adena, Huck, and Rasul (2014) found promising effects of non-binding 
suggestions in a similar environment, Reiley and Samek (2015) found negative effects of 
increasing grids and no better performance of tailored grids. Here we find dramatic effects of 
higher grids for non-frequent users: they donate less often and the overall return from them is 
significantly lower.   
 
Post-Study Probability. How confident are we about our findings? The sole reliance on statistical 
significance can lead to false positives. As Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014) highlight, the rate 
of false positives depends on statistical power, research priors, and the number of scholars 
exploring the question. Indeed, there has been some work done recently on image concerns in 
charitable giving and ask avoidance. Although our findings are novel in at least two ways (pure 
self-image in the field, long-term effects of ask avoidance), they are a logical continuation of 
previous research. In a general sense (see Levitt and List 2009), our study can be seen as a 
replication of the previous studies of ask avoidance: we test the previous hypotheses with new 
research designs. For example, in Section 6 we test the ask avoidance hypothesis in a different 
setting than the previous studies do, but we largely addresses the same question. Our results point 
in the same direction as the previous findings. Now, we provide a fourth study in favor of ask 
avoidance additional to DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012), Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 
(2017), and Trachtman et al. (2015) (although, we do not know how many studies with null 
results were undertaken and not published). Following Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014), we 
compute the change in the post-study probability after our replication (see Table A9 in the 
Appendix). The conclusions are that (i) even with a very low prior it is difficult to believe that all 
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four papers find results that are a statistical artefact, (ii) our replication makes a real difference 
for the posterior probability if the assumed prior probability is low. 
 
 
8 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we study an online fundraising campaign introduced on a ticketing platform by an 
opera house. This is an important setting to study, since an increasing portion of charitable giving 
is moving online. But the question of “how” and foremost “whether” at all is still open. 
Especially, it is not clear whether the findings about more traditional fundraising channels (e.g. 
Landry et al. 2006; Landry et al. 2010; Adena, Huck, and Rasul 2014; Adena and Huck 2017) 
carry over to the new environment. We contribute to a better understanding of “how” in online 
fundraising by studying donation grids and navigation structures. Against our expectations, we 
find that higher donation grids result in a substantially lower response rate, similar positive 
donations and consequently much lower returns. Then we demonstrate that a small, apparently 
superficial, change in the design of the choice architecture has unexpectedly large positive effects 
on giving. Not allowing for the possibility of conveniently overlooking the ask increases both, the 
response rate and positive donations – resulting in a substantial increase in return. This points to a 
pure self-signaling motive in charitable giving. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is 
the first to document the possible presence of such a self-image effect in the field.13  
 
Finally, we provide evidence of the fundraiser’s long-term costs of ask avoidance that result from 
more insistent fundraising. This suggests that the question of “whether” to engage in additional 
online fundraising is non-trivial. Overall, we conclude that fundraising management should not 
take place in isolation but that broader operational concerns require consideration.  
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Appendix A (additional information): 
A1: Charity appeal 
Figure A1: Charity appeal (first screen) and how the checkboxes were incorporated 
T1 and T2 T3 
  
Notes: In Treatment 1 and 2 the (*) was missing and it was possible to click the button “weiter” (proceed, in the bottom right 
corner) without checking one of the boxes. In Treatment 3 one had to check either box before proceeding. 
Translation: Get children to the opera! Give socially disadvantaged children and adolescents an 
unforgettable evening at the opera house free of charge. The donations received are converted 
into free tickets for children and adolescents that cannot afford to buy a ticket. The allocation is 
made by the Campus department of the Bavarian State Opera, which is in contact with interested 
schools. Thank you very much for your support!  Your Bavarian State Opera 
Figure A2: Charity appeal (second screen): 
 
Notes: Those were the grids in Treatment 1. In Treatment 2 and 3 the grids were respectively 200, 100, 50 and 20 EUR. 
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A2 Donation and ticket data 
A2.1 Overall 
 
In total, 96 donations were made adding up to €3,780 (€39.38 on average) over 81 days. In the 
same time period 9,578 buyers purchased 27,787 tickets (not counting the donation “tickets”) in 
13,041 visits to the booking platform. 
 
Figure 1 shows the numbers of donations in different monetary categories by treatment. The bars 
are subdivided by type of customers. We distinguish between one-time buyers14 (dotted bars, 
7,950 customers); non-frequent repeated buyers on the condition that they do so only during one 
distinct treatment (solid bars, additional 492 customers making a total of 8,442); and frequent 
buyers arriving in at least two distinct treatments (striped bars, a further 1,136 customers making 
a grand total of 9,578). It is immediately evident that the frequency of donations is much lower in 
T2 although it spanned the longest time period of 33 days. The numbers of top donations do not 
vary much between treatments. In all treatments there are exactly three donations equal to or 
higher than €100. 
For the subsequent analysis, we remove the buyers who arrived at the platform in multiple 
treatments. In what follows, we shall refer to the remaining customers (one-time buyers and 
buyers who bought repeatedly in the same treatment) as non-frequent buyers. In this sample, 
there were 8,442 customers in 9,028 visits, who made 65 donations of €33.23 on average. By 
adopting this approach, we avoid possible spillovers between treatments but, at the same time, do 
not account for frequent buyers, who may differ in their reaction to the treatments. Appendix C 
provides some additional analysis for frequent buyers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Note that this does not mean that they are first-time buyers. Indeed, around one quarter of them purchased tickets 
in the previous season. 
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Figure A3: Donation values by Treatment 
T1: lower grids 
Duration: 28 days; 
Grids: €10, €20, €50, €100; 
Number of donations: 43 
 
T2: higher grids 
Duration: 33 days; 
Grids: €20, €50, €100, €200 
(donation of €10 and €30 
was not possible); 
Number of donations: 22 
 
T3: higher grids + 
forced statement 
Duration: 20 days; 
Grids: €20, €50, €100, €200 
(donation of €10 and €30 
was not possible); 
Number of donations: 31 
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Table A1 presents averages in different treatments in the raw data. The return, average donation 
including zeros, is more than double in T1(with the lower grid) as in T2 (with the higher grid) (21 
cents per buyer versus 9 cents). Crucially, the return increases even further in T3 (higher grids 
plus forced statement) – to 57 cents. A similar pattern is observed for the response rate, which is 
more than double in T1 than in T2 (0.8% versus 0.3%), and increases further in T3 to 1.3%.  In 
terms of the average positive donation the values in T1 and T2 are similar (€25, €27 respectively) 
but in T3 the average positive donation increases to €45.  
 
Table A1: Averages in different treatments 
 Treatment T1: lower grids T2: higher grids T3: forced statement 
 days 28 33 20 
 N 3513 3533 1982 
  mean s.d.  mean s.d.  mean s.d.  
Ticket 
behavior 
at t 
Average single ticket 
value (in €) 53.13 0.770  54.3 0.760  64.48 1.180  
Total money spent 
excluding donation, 
including festival 
tickets (in €) 
112.28 2.000  115.23 1.990  139.86 3.160  
Average number of 
tickets excluding 
donation, including 
festival tickets 
2.15 0.018  2.15 0.021  2.18 0.025  
Ticket 
behavior 
at t1 
Dummy customer 0.309 0.462  0.328 0.470  0.283 0.450  
Number of tickets 2.737 7.996  3.223 9.374  2.006 6.928  
Total money spent 132.025 466.404  150.970 423.183  115.516 402.622  
Donative 
behavior 
Average donation  per 
buyer (including zeros) 
(in €) 
0.208 0.053  0.085 0.028  0.57 0.169  
Dummy response rate 0.008 0.002  0.003 0.001  0.013 0.003  
Average positive 
donation 25.17 4.430 N=29 27.27 3.840 N=11 45.2 10.150 N=25 
Median donation 20 20 20 
 
A2.2 Day-level  
 
Donations 
Figure 2, Panel A presents day-level donation data for the sample of non-frequent buyers. Panel 
B presents the numbers of no-thank-you or already-donated statements checked when choosing 
not to donate. Distinct treatments are marked with vertical dashed lines. The number of donors, 
number of donation-tickets chosen, average and total value of donations per day decline visibly 
from T1 to T2, i.e., from the lower to the higher grid. Although the reduction in the response rate 
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might have been expected, we would instead have expected an increase in the value of donations 
in T2.  
The overall decrease in contributions in T2 seems to be reversed after the introduction of the 
change in website navigation (holding the higher grid constant) in T3.  
Finally, we also observe a big jump in the number of “No, thank you” box checks in treatment 3 
(Panel B) confirming the role of the change in website navigation.15  
 
 
Tickets 
Advance online sales of regular tickets begin at 10 am two months before a performance.16 If the 
pre-sale date falls on a Sunday or holiday, the ticket sale starts on the working day before. That 
means that almost each day new tickets are released and that the pool of available regular tickets 
should remain approximately the same over time. There was one important exception since 
shortly before the end of T2 summer festival tickets were released all at once. The festival 
performances started two months after our online fundraising. 
Panel C of Figure 2 presents ticket related daily data. The top left picture shows the daily number 
of buyers. The number of buyers falls slightly over time for regular performances. There is higher 
variation in the number of buyers in T1. For example, the first spike marks the release day for the 
ballet “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” (fifth performance out of six that are sold in our period) 
that accounts for 52 new buyers and for two guest ballet performances “Sasha Waltz & Guests” 
on two subsequent days that account for 34 new buyers. The three following spikes are the 
release days for the opera “La traviata” with respectively 70, 113, and 100 unique buyers. On top 
of 70 buyers of “La traviata,” there were 59 buyers of newly released tickets for the opera 
“Parsifal.” Concerning festival ticket buyers, on the first day of the release a relatively large 
number of buyers arrived (more than 250). After the release day, the numbers stabilized at 
approximately 25 buyers per day. The top left picture in Panel C shows the number of buyers for 
different ticket categories separately (excluding festival tickets).17 
The bottom left picture presents the daily average price of tickets sold. The average for regular 
                                                          
15 Unfortunately, for box checks, we have only aggregate daily data and cannot link it to the individuals.  
16 Advance sales by the mean of a letter begin three months in advance. 
17 Note that the sum is larger than in the top left picture since some visitors might buy tickets for different 
performance categories at one visit. 
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performances was slightly higher at the end of T1 and in T3. The average prices for festival 
tickets were appx. 50% higher than regular performances. Overall, the average regular ticket 
price for an opera amounted to €63.23 (ballet €37.92, concert €26.78, other €36.26). For opera 
tickets during the festival, the average price was €89.78. 
The bottom right picture shows the length of time between the purchase and the performance date 
for regular performances and festival tickets separately. For regular performances there was an 
U-shaped pattern with most of the tickets bought at the time of release two months before the 
performance (the spike around 60 days before the showing). More tickets were also sold shortly 
before the performance date. The festival tickets were bought between 50 and 120 days before 
the performance (during our period) with slightly more tickets bought earlier than later. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Day-level results  
Panel A: Donative behavior 
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Panel B: Statements checked  
  
  
Panel C: Ticket related behavior 
   
   
Notes: Panel A and C are based on the sample of non-frequent buyers. Panel B is based on the full sample 
due to the availability at the aggregate level only, i.e. including frequent buyers. The spike at the end of 
the second period marks begin of the sale of the remaining tickets for the summer festival starting two 
month later. The suspension period between T2 and T3 has been cut-off. 
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A2.3 Ticket sequencing for non-festival performances 
In the preceding subsection, we saw that the timing of arrival of individuals at the platform is 
influenced by the release of tickets. In this subsection, we study how the timing of arrival 
depends on individual characteristics. In OLS regressions in Table 2 we analyze the timing of 
arrival at the platform depending on past characteristics of customers. We also control for gender 
and corporates. Overall, 45% are identified as male, 49% as female, 0.25% as corporate, and the 
remainder 8% is non-defined. The dependent variables are: time (days) in Column I, treatment 
number (1, 2, or 3) in Column II, time between purchase and performance (the maximum for 
those who bought more than one performance tickets) in Column III, and time between purchase 
and performance (the minimum for those who bought than one performance tickets) in Column 
IV. We see that past customers, on average, bought tickets for a particular performance 6-7 days 
earlier than new customers. Also, those who bought more tickets in the past were quicker in 
buying tickets for particular shows. Conditional on being a customer in the past season, those 
who spent more on average last year, arrived later and bought tickets closer to the performance 
date. Past customers who ordered tickets per mail last year arrived earlier. Ordering through mail 
has the advantage that the processing begins three months in advance in contrast to two months in 
advance at the online platform, which implies better access to tickets to popular shows. 
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Table A2: Timing of arrival 
Dependent variable: Time (days) Treatment (1, 2, 
3) 
Days between 
purchase and 
last 
performance 
Days between 
purchase and 
first 
performance 
 I II III IV 
dummy customer in previous 
season 
-1.716 
(-1.64) 
-0.044 
(-1.47) 
6.856*** 
(8.13) 
5.886*** 
(6.95) 
number of tickets previous 
season 
-0.014 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
0.190*** 
(5.24) 
0.186*** 
(5.10) 
average value of ticket 
previous season 
0.026** 
(2.12) 
0.001* 
(1.82) 
-0.045*** 
(-4.60) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.79) 
dummy box office in previous 
season 
-1.751 
(-0.99) 
-0.040 
(-0.80) 
1.235 
(0.87) 
1.111 
(0.78) 
dummy letter in previous 
season 
-2.373** 
(-2.10) 
-0.065** 
(-2.02) 
2.099** 
(2.31) 
1.271 
(1.39) 
dummy phone in previous 
season 
2.267 
(1.59) 
0.063 
(1.56) 
-1.664 
(-1.45) 
-1.625 
(-1.41) 
female -1.540*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.040** 
(-2.37) 
0.332 
(0.70) 
0.325 
(0.68) 
firm 11.307** 
(2.00) 
0.250 
(1.56) 
0.307 
(0.07) 
1.044 
(0.23) 
other -0.295 
(-0.26) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
-3.467*** 
(-3.87) 
-3.503*** 
(-3.89) 
Constant 38.926*** 
(81.79) 
1.796*** 
(133.40) 
30.015*** 
(78.46) 
29.369*** 
(76.37) 
Observations 8317 8317 8317 8317 
R2 0.003 0.003 0.033 0.026 
Notes: OLS regressions, t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, excluding festival ticket 
buyers; other means that the customer was neither identified as female, nor male, nor firm. 
 
A3: Additional results 
Table A3: Rare events logit, first differences 
Dependent variable Donation dummy 
 (I) (II) (III) 
    
T1:lower grids 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (2.68) (2.69) (2.62) 
    
T3: statement required 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
(3.81) (3.77) (4.01) 
Controls I no yes yes 
Controls II no no yes 
Observations 9028 9028 9028 
Notes: sample of non-frequent buyers (without buyers present in different treatments); treatment dummies set at 0 and other 
control variables at mean; controls I include number of tickets and average value of ticket at t=0; controls II include dummy 
customer, number of tickets, and average value of ticket at t-1, performance type dummies, and day of week dummies; * p < 0.10, 
35 
 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; z-statistics from relogit in parentheses. 
 
Table A4: Long-term effects on tickets online 
Dependent variable: number of tickets online in the next season (including zeros) 
Specification:  Tobit m.e.y* 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -0.189 
(-0.94) 
-0.163 
(-1.15) 
-0.121 
(-1.12) 
-0.026 
(-0.18) 
-0.224 
(-1.44) 
-0.121 
(-1.20) 
T3: statement required -0.410* 
(-1.83) 
-0.805*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.197 
(-1.41) 
-0.502*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.366** 
(-2.05) 
-0.253** 
(-2.02) 
Donor dummy  1.181*** 
(2.74) 
0.749** 
(2.49) 
1.113*** 
(2.71) 
1.249*** 
(3.00) 
0.776*** 
(2.66) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.016 0.092 0.013 0.017 0.103 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; z-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy; Marginal effects 
after Tobit with lower limit set to zero. 
 
Table A5: Long-term effects on revenue online 
Dependent variable: online ticket revenue in the next season (ticket value including zeros) 
Specification:  Tobit m.e.y* 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -14.191 
(-1.20) 
-12.457 
(-1.58) 
-9.639 
(-1.42) 
-5.706 
(-0.77) 
-13.573* 
(-1.85) 
-9.984* 
(-1.84) 
T3: statement required -16.896 
(-1.33) 
-39.762*** 
(-3.04) 
-8.928 
(-1.12) 
-24.178** 
(-2.32) 
-16.176* 
(-1.79) 
-10.666 
(-1.52) 
Donor dummy  58.187*** 
(3.04) 
37.700** 
(2.43) 
55.413*** 
(3.13) 
61.584*** 
(3.34) 
38.798** 
(2.48) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.006 0.044 0.007 0.008 0.048 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; z-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy; Marginal effects 
after Tobit with lower limit set to zero. 
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Table A6: Long-term effects on all tickets 
Dependent variable: number of tickets (all means including online, box office, mail, and phone)  in the next season (ticket value 
including zeros) 
Specification:  Tobit m.e.y* 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -0.380 
(-1.00) 
-0.331 
(-1.27) 
-0.185 
(-1.13) 
-0.073 
(-0.30) 
-0.410 
(-1.58) 
-0.135 
(-1.07) 
T3: statement required -0.586 
(-1.50) 
-1.298*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.117 
(-0.59) 
-0.793*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.516* 
(-1.73) 
-0.175 
(-0.96) 
Donor dummy  1.875*** 
(3.03) 
0.932*** 
(2.96) 
1.821*** 
(3.15) 
2.017*** 
(3.46) 
0.978*** 
(3.09) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.012 0.127 0.011 0.016 0.134 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; z-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy; Marginal effects 
after Tobit with lower limit set to zero. 
 
Table A7: Long-term effects on whole ticket revenue 
Dependent variable: ticket  revenue (all means including online, box office, mail, and phone)  in the next season (ticket value 
including zeros) 
Specification:  Tobit m.e.y* 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -23.566 
(-1.07) 
-20.689 
(-1.42) 
-11.335 
(-1.06) 
-7.295 
(-0.56) 
-20.950 
(-1.64) 
-9.312 
(-1.20) 
T3: statement required -22.326 
(-1.00) 
-64.788*** 
(-2.77) 
-3.053 
(-0.25) 
-37.755** 
(-2.16) 
-23.163 
(-1.47) 
-4.296 
(-0.37) 
Donor dummy  99.170*** 
(3.32) 
51.076** 
(2.08) 
96.561*** 
(3.38) 
105.833*** 
(3.61) 
52.146** 
(2.06) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.006 0.056 0.007 0.008 0.059 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; z-statistics; demographics include female, corporate, and other dummy; Marginal effects 
after Tobit with lower limit set to zero. 
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Table A8: Long-term effects on the probability of being an online customer next season 
Dependent variable: internet customer next year (dummy) 
Specification:  Logit m.e. 
 I II III IV V VI 
T1: lower grids -0.012 
(-0.54) 
-0.009 
(-0.58) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
0.004 
(0.26) 
-0.016 
(-0.95) 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
T3: statement required -0.027 
(-1.15) 
-0.073*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.038* 
(-1.89) 
-0.023 
(-1.16) 
-0.017 
(-1.02) 
Donor dummy  0.125*** 
(2.77) 
0.081** 
(1.99) 
0.127*** 
(2.89) 
0.139*** 
(3.25) 
0.088** 
(2.13) 
Ticket controls at t  yes    yes 
Past season controls   yes   yes 
Performance type 
controls 
   yes  yes 
Time controls     yes yes 
Demographics   yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 8442 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.021 0.192 0.022 0.028 0.204 
Notes:  see notes to Table 1; z-statistics; m.e. marginal effects. 
 
Table A9: The Post-Study Probability given 2 replications and adding our study as a function of 
prior probability and power. 
prior probability: Power=0.80 Power=0.50 
low (0.01) 0.47 ->0.91 0.45->0.89 
Medium (0.10) 0.91->0.99 0.90->0.99 
High (0.55) 0.99->1.00 0.99->1.00 
Note: The table displays a relevant subset of Table 4 in Maniadis et al. 2014. For relatively large effects as found in 
our study and over 8,000 subjects, the power of our study is high. 
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Figure A5: Results of a placebo exercise – estimating effects of a fictive treatment 
 Logit m.e. donation dummy OLS return (donation value including zeros) 
Fictive 
treatmen
t in the 
first part 
of T1 
period 
  
Fictive 
treatmen
t in in 
the first 
part of 
T2 
period 
  
Fictive 
treatmen
t in in 
the first 
part of 
T3 
period 
  
Notes: all regressions are at the individual level and include the full set of controls (some are dropped in small 
samples), see notes to Table 1 and Table 4. All observations in the respective (T1, T2, or T3) period are used. The 
day of hypothetical change is shifted starting at three and going stepwise up to the maximum number of day minus 
three. 
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A4: frequent buyers 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the importance of the 1,136 more frequent buyers, 22 of which made 31 
donations, yielding an overall response rate of 1.9% and return per frequent buyer of €1.43. In the 
following, we include frequent buyers in our regression analysis but also add interactions of the 
treatment dummies with a frequent buyer dummy (Table C1). The coefficients on the frequent 
buyers dummy are positive in all specifications but significant only in some. This suggests an 
overall higher response rate, higher donations and higher returns from frequent buyers. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on the interaction between T3 and frequent buyers are negative in 
all specifications and they are similar in magnitude to the T3 coefficients (all significant except in 
the OLS specifications). Based on a Wald test we cannot reject the equality between the (absolute 
value) coefficients on T3 and the T3*frequent buyer interaction dummy. This suggests that T3 
had no effect on frequent buyers, although this may be a spillover effect. 
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Table A10: Regression analysis: including frequent buyers 
 Logit m.e. OLS OLS 
Dependent 
variable: 
donation dummy return (donation value including zeros) positive donations 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) 
T1:lower grids 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.123** 0.123** 0.112* -2.100 -5.409 -6.475 
 (2.63) (2.63) (2.59) (2.06) (2.06) (1.89) (-0.36) (-0.70) (-0.53) 
          
T3: forced 
statement  
0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.485*** 0.458** 0.474*** 17.927 20.282 8.621 
 (3.53) (3.47) (3.57) (2.83) (2.51) (2.63) (1.64) (1.38) (0.51) 
          
T1* frequent 
buyer 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.285* -0.275* -0.298* -42.380* -26.258 -19.505 
 (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.22) (-1.81) (-1.76) (-1.89) (-1.98) (-1.34) (-0.93) 
          
T3* frequent 
buyer 
-0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.745** -0.715** -0.763** -62.170 -49.971** -35.610 
 (-2.01) (-2.00) (-2.14) (-2.20) (-2.24) (-2.28) (-1.62) (-2.07) (-1.58) 
          
frequent buyer 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.432 0.471 0.676 53.636 40.866* 36.554* 
 (1.53) (1.52) (1.63) (1.59) (1.53) (1.46) (1.46) (1.98) (1.67) 
          
number of 
tickets 
 -0.000 0.000  0.213 0.275  15.183 18.826* 
  (-0.22) (0.17)  (0.87) (1.00)  (1.42) (1.98) 
          
average value 
of ticket 
 -0.000 -0.000  0.002 0.002  0.068 0.071 
  (-0.03) (-0.29)  (0.85) (0.77)  (0.75) (0.61) 
          
dummy 
customer in 
previous 
season 
  0.000   -0.089   -1.396 
   (0.07)   (-0.52)   (-0.08) 
          
number of 
tickets 
previous 
season 
  -0.000   -0.003   -0.160 
   (-1.59)   (-1.42)   (-0.32) 
          
average value 
of ticket 
previous 
season 
  0.000   0.001   -0.018 
   (0.86)   (0.35)   (-0.11) 
          
Performance 
type dummies 
  yes   yes   yes 
          
          
Day of week 
dummies 
  yes   yes   yes 
          
Observations 13041 13041 13041 13041 13041 13041 96 96 96 
Pseudo R2 /R2 0.017 0.017 0.034 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.084 0.290 0.420 
Wald test  
T3=- T3* 
frequent buyer 
0.8491 0.8505 0.9676 0.3742 0.3724 0.3142 0.2316 0.1371 0.1906 
Notes: full sample (with buyers present in different treatments), z- and t- statistics in parentheses, errors clustered at the individual 
level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, m.e.: marginal effects. 
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